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As in the residue of the world, Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24 is casting a long shadow across Africa. Despite the geographical altitude, there are important ties between Ukraine and Africa, including more 8,000 Moroccans and 4,000 Nigerians studying in Ukraine and over $4 billion in exports from Ukraine to Africa.

Although some African countries may benefit from a shift in global markets abroad from Russia due to the crisis, the curt-term potential impacts on economic livelihoods are worrying while the implications for pan-African solidarity and adherence to multilateralism increasingly uncertain.

Benefits for natural resource exporters

A few countries are sensing long-term growth opportunities from the crisis. Specifically, Africa's natural gas could reduce Europe'southward dependence on Russian energy. For example, Tanzania's president, Samia Suluhu Hassan, stated in an interview on the sidelines of the European union (Eu)-African Union (AU) elevation in mid-February that the tensions in Ukraine are generating growing interest in the country's gas reserves, which are the 6th-largest in Africa. Her nationalist predecessor, the tardily President John Magufuli, suspended talks with natural gas investors in 2019 to review the state'south production sharing agreement regime. Hassan, however, favors a more business-friendly arroyo and has revamped negotiations with energy companies in the hopes of attracting $30 billion in foreign investment to revive construction of offshore liquified natural gas projects in 2023.

Several other countries could similarly benefit from Europe's energy diversification, including Senegal, where 40 trillion cubic feet of natural gas were discovered betwixt 2014 and 2017 and where production is expected to starting time later this year. Nigeria, already a supplier of liquified natural gas (LNG) to several European countries, is also embarking with Niger and Algeria on the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline to increase exports of natural gas to European markets. On February 16, the three countries signed an agreement to develop the pipeline, estimated to toll $13 billion. Europe is likely to exist a key financer, bolstered past the EU's controversial decision in early February to label investments in natural gas as "green" free energy.

Besides natural gas, further sanctions on Russia might benefit other natural resource exporters in the region. For instance, S Africa is, later on Russia, the globe's second-biggest producer of palladium—a critical input into automobiles and electronics—and therefore could feel growing demand as a result of international sanctions placed on Russia. Similarly, as a major exporter of gilt, the South African rand has been strengthening every bit a result of rising global prices for the precious metal.

Household vulnerability from fuel, fertilizer, and food impacts

Despite these possibilities, in the nigh term, the invasion of Ukraine could pose hardships for African households, the agronomical sector, and food security. The ascent cost of oil on global markets—induced by the crisis in Europe—will have straight impacts on the cost of send. In fact, S Africa's automobile association predicts that March will bring tape-loftier fuel prices to that country. In Zambia, which agreed to cut fuel subsidies in order to adhere to post-pandemic debt negotiations with the International Budgetary Fund (International monetary fund), rising costs will make such reforms even more unpopular than they already were. Much to the disappointment of the Imf, terminal calendar month, Nigeria already backed away from its plans to cut fuel subsidies after planned protests from labor unions and opposition parties.

Rising free energy costs as well affect the production of fertilizer, which is often a necessary input for a productive agricultural sector. The costs of urea and phosphate—2 major components of fertilizer—had already risen by 30 and 4 percent, respectively, past the stop of 2021. These increases, plus fertilizer export bans by Cathay and Russia through at to the lowest degree June 2022, will cause the cost of fertilizer to ascent. In Africa, depression natural soil fertility ways that chemic fertilizer is oft essential for food production, and several countries have had fertilizer subsidy schemes in place since the Abuja fertilizer summit in 2006 and food price crisis of 2008/2009. However, continued climbing prices volition further reduce the already narrow fiscal infinite many African governments are negotiating in the wake of COVID-19. The ascent toll of fertilizer will too drag nutrient costs.

For several African countries, high dependence on wheat imports from Russian federation or Ukraine poses a further immediate concern. Jointly, the ii countries institute almost 30 pct of global wheat exports. Investors and market analysts have worried about Russia blockading Ukraine's Black Sea ports, which would prevent Ukraine from exporting the residuum of last season's wheat harvest. As noted in a recent analysis in Foreign Policy, much of Ukraine's nigh fertile agronomics state is in the eastward of the state where Russian attacks commenced. Moreover, some experts have warned that, should the state of war drag on, Russia could also impose export tariffs on its wheat to improve its food security. When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, wheat prices increased by 25 percent over two months. Due to the current geopolitical tensions, all major wheat exporters reported higher prices over the past month.

Chiefly, during the 2020-2021 agricultural season, Africa—northward and south of the Sahara—represented 36 percent of Ukraine's total wheat exports and was by far the largest regional destination. Kenya, which imports most of its wheat from both Ukraine and Russia, has seen rising nutrient prices in recent weeks that are generating growing acrimony on social media. Elsewhere in East Africa, importers of wheat from the Black Ocean region are already facing extremely volatile social and political circumstances that could be worsened by ascent food prices. For instance, several years ago, Russia began to replace Australia as the main source of wheat imports into Sudan. The retail toll of wheat and wheat flour had already increased due to a blockade by protesters of imports from Port Sudan in October 2021, resulting in staples prices being, on average, 100 to 200 percent higher than they were final year. In a country where politics are deeply intertwined with the toll of bread, elevated wheat prices will further fuel civilian anger and demonstrations in Khartoum well-nigh the military insurrection in October 2021. In Ethiopia, changing diets have meant that wheat constitutes fourteen percent of the country's total caloric intake, and the country relies on imports to satisfy 25 per centum of local demand. After the U.South., Ukraine is the land'south biggest source of wheat and wheat flour imports—meaning that cost spikes caused past a Russian invasion would exacerbate already loftier levels of food insecurity generated by Ethiopia'due south civil war.

Regional solidarity will be tested

Finally, while well-nigh attention has focused on the implications of this crisis for trans-Atlantic relations and NATO unity, the invasion of Ukraine presents a meaning examination of the concept of pan-African solidarity and regionalism. In recent months, the set up of institutions intended to represent this solidarity—from the African Union (AU) to the Economic Community of Westward African States (ECOWAS) as well every bit the Southern African Evolution Customs (SADC)—take been undermined by conflicting views amongst heads of country over how to handle the spate of coups in the Sahel and ascent insurgency across the continent. In Burkina Faso, the Fundamental African Republic, Guinea, and Mali, big-calibration protests have featured citizens prominently waving the Russian flag and military leaders inviting Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group to tackle jihadists.

Past contrast, the AU's ain Constitutive Act in 2002 supports the inviolability of borders and the norm of territorial integrity. On Th, the continental body condemned Russia's invasion and called for an firsthand ceasefire. Republic of kenya's ambassador to the Un underscored in February 2022 that a Russian invasion would undermine Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Ghanaian administrator echoed a like sentiment, lamenting Russia's decision to recognize parts of eastern Ukraine and abandoning the Minsk agreements.

More by and large though, the conflict has put many African leaders in a difficult position and attempting to forge a neutral position. South Africa's neutrality had for weeks frustrated European union and Ukrainian diplomats who nonetheless recognize its special role with Russian federation via the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, Republic of india, China, and S Africa) grouping of middle-income countries. Only after the invasion on Thursday did the Southward African government finally take a stronger stance, calling for Russia to withdraw its forces. Significantly, the Nigerian government only noted its surprise nearly the invasion but neither condemned it nor called for a cessation of hostilities.

More broadly, African governments have shown growing interest in edifice relationships with both the W and the East in order to diversify trade, investment, and aid options. Russian federation has reasserted itself in recent years through both security and economic influence on the continent. Red china, which appears to accept tacitly condoned the invasion, has of course been a major presence in the region for the last decade, investing close to $3 billion in 2021 alone. In that location is minimal interest in returning to an era when African leaders needed to show allegiances to a Cold War power. However, given the outright invasion of Ukraine and the violation of international police force, the key question at present is how African governments will maintain their relationships with their diverse set of external partners—and with one some other—as the geopolitical context dramatically shifts.

Source: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/02/25/what-does-the-war-in-ukraine-mean-for-africa/

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